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The Degree of Judicial Enforcement and Credit Markets: 
Evidence from Japanese Household Panel Data 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper, we conduct an empirical analysis of the impact of better judicial 
enforcement on the probability of being credit rationed, loan size, and the probability of 
bankruptcy using household-level data from the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers, 
conducted by the Institute for Research on Household Economics, in conjunction with 
judicial data by court district on trial length and the ratio of the number of pending civil 
trials to the number of incoming civil trials.  Contrary to the predictions of the existing 
theory, we find that better judicial enforcement increases the probability of being credit 
rationed and decreases loan size.  Furthermore, we find that better judicial enforcement 
increases the probability of bankruptcy, a result that is consistent with lax screening 
effects. 
 
Keywords: Judicial enforcement; Credit allocation; Credit rationing; Bankruptcy; 
Screening; Household Behavior; Borrowing 
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Since the mid-1990s, the impact of legal systems on the economy has been the 
focus of many theoretical and empirical investigations.  As one example of this, many 
studies, which originate with La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), 
have analyzed the relationship between legal systems and financial markets.  In these 
studies, the following two channels through which the legal system affects financial 
markets were identified: (1) the degree of judicial enforcement and (2) the content of the 
law. 
     In Japan, since laws apply to the nation as a whole, the content of the law is 
uniform in all judicial districts.  However, the degree of judicial enforcement may vary 
from district to district.  Thus, this paper focuses on differences in the degree of 
judicial enforcement from district to district.  The fact that the content of the law is 
uniform throughout the country in Japan makes it possible to distinguish the impact of 
the degree of enforcement from that of the content of the law, whereas this is not 
possible in other countries, where different states have different laws. 
The length of trials in Japan has become shorter and shorter over time.  For 
example, the average length of civil trial proceedings in district courts was 17.3 months 
in 1973, 12.9 months in 1990, and 7.8 months in 2006.  In 2003, the “Act on the 
Expedition of Trials”1 was promulgated with the objective of concluding trials as 
quickly as possible and protecting defendants’ rights through fair, appropriate, and 
adequate proceedings.  Moreover, Japanese courts have conducted research on how to 
improve the efficiency of trial proceedings.  Several means have been used to achieve 
this objective--for example, organizing issues more logically and intensively 
investigating the most appropriate evidence. 
Given these changes, the question that arises is how the duration of trials affects 
economic behavior?  Theory predicts that better judicial enforcement (i.e., faster court 
proceedings) will decrease the probability of being credit rationed, increase loan size, 
and increase the probability of bankruptcy.  In this paper, we conduct an empirical 
analysis of the impact of better judicial enforcement (i.e., faster court proceedings) on 
the probability of being credit rationed, loan size, and the probability of bankruptcy 
using household-level data from the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers, conducted 
by the Institute for Research on Household Economics, in conjunction with judicial data 
by court district on trial length and the ratio of the number of pending civil trials to the 
number of incoming civil trials. 
There are at least three contributions of this paper.  First, while many studies 
conducted in Japan have analyzed the determinants of the probability of being credit 
rationed and loan size, thus far no study has focused on the impact of the degree of 
judicial enforcement on credit allocation.  This is an important issue, especially in 
Japan, where the duration of trials has become shorter and is expected to become even 
shorter in the future.  Since the micro data on Japanese households from the “Japanese 
Panel Survey of Consumers”2 (hereafter the JPSC) contain detailed information on the 
respondent’s residence, we could combine these data with data on judicial districts and 
analyze the impact of the degree of judicial enforcement on credit allocation. 
Second, in this paper, we controlled for more explanatory variables that capture 
the local economic situation and local credit market activity than previous studies (for 
                                                  
1 In Japanese, Saiban no Jinsokuka ni kansuru Houritsu. 
2 In Japanese, Shouhi Seikatsu ni kansuru Paneru Chousa. 
3 
 
example, gross domestic product, the bad loan ratio, market concentration, and the 
depth of the credit market at the prefectural level).  Since the pace at which district 
courts function is affected by these local factors, it is crucial to control for these factors 
in order to capture the pure impact of the degree of judicial enforcement. 
Finally, our data set allowed us to investigate the impact of the degree of judicial 
enforcement on the flow (rather than the stock) of debt.  The current degree of judicial 
enforcement can be expected to affect the amount of loans most recently granted by 
banks, but all previous studies, with the exception of Fabbri (2002), employ the stock of 
debt to examine the impact of the degree of judicial enforcement on loan size.  Most of 
these studies find the impact of the degree of judicial enforcement to be insignificant, 
but one possible reason for this is that the stock of debt reflects not only the current 
choices of lenders and borrowers but also their past choices. 
     This paper is organized as follows: Section I surveys the results of previous 
theoretical and empirical studies.  In section II, the data used in our estimation are 
described.  In section III, the estimation method and estimation results are presented.  
Finally, section IV concludes. 
     To summarize the main findings of this paper, we find that better judicial 
enforcement increases the probability of being credit rationed and decreases loan size, 
contrary to the prediction of the existing theory.  We provide one possible 
interpretation of these results at the end of Section III.B.  Moreover, we find that better 
judicial enforcement increases the probability of bankruptcy, a result that is consistent 
with lax screening effects.  
 
I. Previous Studies 
In this section, we survey the theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of 
the degree of judicial enforcement on credit constraints, loan size, and bankruptcy.  
First, we survey previous analyses of the impact of the degree of judicial 
enforcement on credit constraints and loan size.  Fabbri and Padula (2004) and Jappelli, 
Pagano, and Bianco (2005) formalized the economic mechanism through which court 
performance affects credit allocation.  For example, Fabbri and Padula (2004) assumed 
that a loan contract is securitized with collateral and that, if the borrower fails to repay, 
the title to the collateral is transferred to the bank.  The key assumption is that the 
judicial system determines when the collateral is transferred to the bank in the case of 
bankruptcy.  If the enforcement procedure is slow, the probability that borrowers are 
credit constrained might increase because borrowers’ incentive to repay loans is reduced.  
In addition, slower court proceedings might reduce the equilibrium amount of debt 
because banks would be expected to compensate for the lower liquidation value of the 
pledged collateral by raising interest rates. 
Jappelli, Pagano, and Bianco (2005) employed Italian provincial data for the 
1984-95 period as well as data on an indicator of judicial efficiency from the Italian 
National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) and found that the stock of pending trials per 
thousand inhabitants (an indicator of poor judicial enforcement) was significantly 
associated with (1) more overdraft loans (an indicator of credit constraints) and (2) a 
lower lending-to-GDP ratio.  All of these findings are consistent with their theoretical 
predictions.  Moreover, Fabbri (2002) employed firm-level data from Spain for the 
year 1998 as well as data on two indicators of the degree of judicial enforcement from 
the Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE) and found that both indicators of poor 
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enforcement (viz., the length of trials and the number of proceedings that last more than 
one year divided by the total number of concluded proceedings) have a negative impact 
on the logarithm of total credit granted during 1998 and on the stock of financial debt.  
Furthermore, by using firm-level data from Italy for the year 1991 together with the 
ISTAT data, she found that an indicator of better judicial enforcement (viz., the ratio of 
completed judicial proceedings to the total number of pending proceedings) has a 
positive impact on the stock of total debt and that an indicator of poor judicial 
enforcement (viz., the length of first trials) has a negative impact thereof.3 
On the other hand, many papers obtain results that do not necessarily support the 
traditional view of judicial efficiency.  For example, Fabbri and Padula (2004) used 
data from the 1989, 1995, and 1998 waves of the “Survey of Household Income and 
Wealth (SHIW)” together with the ISTAT data and found that the ratio of the backlog of 
pending trials to the number of incoming trials (an indicator of poor judicial 
enforcement) has a significantly positive impact on the probability of being credit 
constrained, which is consistent with their theory, but that it does not have a significant 
impact on the amount of debt.  Magri (2007) used the 1989, 1995, and 1998 waves of 
SHIW, the same data set used by Fabbri and Padula (2004), but used a different measure 
of judicial efficiency: the average time for recovery, which was obtained from a 
questionnaire sent by the Bank of Italy to Italian banks.  She found that recovery time 
does not have a significant impact on the probability of being rationed or loan size.  
Alessandrini, Presbitero, and Zazzaro (2008) used the last three waves of Italian 
firm-level data for the 1995-2003 period together with the ISTAT data and found that 
the efficiency of courts in recovering bad loans increases the probability of being 
rationed. 
Next, we survey previous analyses of the relationship between the degree of 
judicial enforcement and bankruptcy.  Many economists and legal experts argue that 
the primary economic function of credit markets is to provide cheap credit.  In order to 
accomplish this goal, they advocate protecting creditor rights strongly.  However, 
credit markets also fulfill other functions, such as the screening of projects.  Zazzaro 
(2005) models the bank’s choice of the quality of screening technology and 
demonstrates that, since improvements in the degree of judicial enforcement might 
reduce the bank’s incentive to adequately screen borrowers, access to credit might be 
harder (easier) for good-type (bad-type) borrowers.  Consequently, better judicial 
enforcement would worsen credit allocation and increase the bankruptcy rate (see 
Manove, Padilla, and Pagano (2001) for similar results).  Jappelli, Pagano, and Bianco 
(2005) found that the stock of pending trials per thousand inhabitants (an indicator of 
poor judicial enforcement) is significantly associated with a lower ratio of 
nonperforming loans to total loans, which is consistent with the theoretical result of 
Zazzaro (2005).  Grant and Padula (2006) used Italian household data from 
Findomestic Banca for the 1995-99 period together with the ISTAT data and found that 
the length of trials does not have a significant impact on the probability of repayment.  
This result is not surprising because the data they used specializes in unsecured credit, 
and the main channel through which the degree of judicial enforcement affects 
repayment behavior is collateral. 
                                                  
3 The length of second and third (appeal) trials does not have a significant impact on the stock of 
total debt. 
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The present paper first tests whether better judicial enforcement decreases the 
probability of being rationed and increases loan size (Sections III.A and B).  
Surprisingly, the estimation results of this paper are opposite in sign to the theoretical 
predictions of the traditional view, and we provide one possible interpretation at the end 
of Section III.B.  We then examine the impact of the degree of judicial enforcement on 
the probability of bankruptcy in Section III.C.  Our findings are consistent with the lax 
screening effect of Zazzaro (2005), whereby better judicial enforcement increases the 
probability of bankruptcy by worsening the quality of credit allocation. 
 
II. Data 
 
In this section, we discuss the data sources used in our analysis and present 
descriptive statistics of our variables pertaining to the degree of judicial enforcement. 
 
A. Household Data 
The Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers (JPSC) is a panel survey of young Japanese 
women that has been conducted annually since 1993 by the Institute for Research on 
Household Economics.4  This paper employs data from the 2003-07 waves of this 
survey because these waves asked respondents whether or not they (or their spouses) 
were credit constrained during the past year.5  While the respondents are all women, 
the survey questions pertain to the respondents as well as their family members, 
including spouses, children, and parents.  The number of observations in 2003, 2004, 
2005, 2006, and 2007 was 2136, 1977, 1863, 1770, and 1694, respectively; thus, our 
study used an unbalanced panel.  After excluding observations that had missing values 
for the variables included in our analysis, the number of observations that remained was 
between 1200 and 1500 in each year.  In sections III.A and III.B, we use only those 
observations in which the household applied for a loan during the past year in order to 
identify households that were rationed by banks.  Households that applied for a loan 
during the past year comprise just over 10% of the total (=710/6862).  In particular, 
such households numbered 166, 157, 125, 150, and 112 in 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 
2007, respectively. 
     There are three advantages to using data from the JPSC.  The biggest advantage 
of using the JPSC data is that this data set includes detailed information regarding the 
respondent’s place of residence.  Thus, we were able to match observations from the 
JPSC data with the judicial data of the relevant district court (see section II.B for 
details).  The second advantage of the JPSC is that it collects data on the size of loans 
granted by financial institutions during the survey year.  In many previous studies 
regarding the degree of judicial enforcement, data on the flow of debt are not available 
                                                  
4 In Japanese, Kakei Keizai Kenkyuusho. 
5 While questions pertaining to credit constraints were included in the 1993 wave as well as in all 
waves after 1998, until 2002, the survey only asked whether respondents (or their spouses) had ever 
been credit constrained, and thus it is impossible to distinguish exactly when they were credit 
constrained.  For this reason, in this study, we do not use the 1993-2002 waves.  In addition, 
unfortunately, in the 2003 wave, respondents aged between 24 and 29 were asked about whether 
they had ever been credit constrained.  Therefore, we had no choice but to assume that respondents 
aged between 24 and 29 in 2003 who had ever been credit constrained were credit constrained 
during the past year. 
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and hence data on the stock of debt are used.  However, the stock of debt reflects the 
past as well as current choices of lenders and borrowers, whereas the current degree of 
judicial enforcement would be expected to affect the credit amount most recently 
granted by banks.  Thus, in our study, we use data on the flow of debt as our measure 
of loan size. The third advantage of the JPSC is that, although it does not collect data on 
whether or not the respondent applied for a loan, it is possible to identify loan applicants 
by using questions on the flow of debt in conjunction with those on credit constraints 
(see section III.A for details). 
 
B. Data on Judicial Districts 
There are several types of courts in Japan: the Supreme Court, high courts, district 
courts, summary courts, and family courts.  When a borrower fails to repay his or her 
loan and the lender wishes to seize the borrower’s property and sell it through a court 
order, the lender must appeal to a district court.  In principle, when a plaintiff (lender) 
wishes to appeal to a court, the competent court is that of the district where the 
defendant (borrower) lives or where the collateral is located.  We used data on all 50 
district courts, taken from the Public Relations Division of the Supreme Court and the 
Annual Report of Judicial Statistics, published by the General Secretariat of the 
Supreme Court of Japan.  All prefectures other than Hokkaido have one district, 
whereas Hokkaido has four.  This means that it is necessary to obtain information 
regarding the city in which Hokkaido respondents reside.  Fortunately, our data set 
collects information regarding the city, town, or village in which the respondent lives.  
Thus, we were able to match observations from the JPSC data with judicial data on the 
relevant district court.6   
In our study, we employed two indicators of the degree of judicial enforcement.  
The first indicator is the length of trials in each district court during the 2003-07 
period.7  Data on the length of trials include all first civil trials in district courts.  
They represent the average amount of time between the date of the initial recording of a 
trial and that of the court verdict in each year.8  In the regression analysis, we use three 
dummy variables (1st Enforcement Quartile1, 2nd Enforcement Quartile1, and 3rd 
                                                  
6 In fact, the court performance of high courts and summary courts may also affect credit allocation.  
This is because high courts have jurisdiction over appeals lodged against judgments of district courts.  
Another reason is that in order to seize the borrower’s property through a court order, lenders need to 
obtain official documents that show the existence of the right to claim loan repayment from 
summary courts.  Thus, in section III, we also use judicial data on high courts and summary courts 
to conduct robustness checks. 
7 We would like to thank the Public Relations Division of the Supreme Court for providing us with 
data on the length of trials in each judicial district.  Since the data are for the 1989-2006 period, we 
constructed the length of trials for the year 2007 by using linear, log, exponential, quadratic, and 
power approximations and by choosing the approximation with the highest R-squared for each 
judicial district.  The equations calculated by Excel are as follows: Y = a + b * X, Y = a + b * 
log(X), Y = a * exp(b * X), Y = a + b * X + c * X2, and Y = a * Xb, respectively.  Y is the length of 
trials, and X is the year.       
8 In order to avoid measurement error, previous studies used indicators of the degree of judicial 
enforcement that excluded cases with no relation to loan contracts.  Unfortunately, we were unable 
to obtain data on the length of trials broken down by the type of case.  Thus, the average length of 
trials for all civil cases is used in this study.  However, for the second indicator of judicial 
enforcement, we excluded all work- and family-related cases. 
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Enforcement Quartile1), which represent quartiles of the distribution of the length of 
trials, with the highest quartile (8.8 months or more) being the excluded category.  
More specifically, 1st Enforcement Quartile1 is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
length of trials is less than 7.4 months and zero otherwise, 2nd Enforcement Quartile1 is 
a dummy variable for trials between 7.4 and 8.1 months, and 3rd Enforcement Quartile1 
is a dummy variable for trials between 8.1 and 8.8 months.  Thus, these dummy 
variables indicate better judicial enforcement as compared to the excluded category. 
The second indicator of the degree of judicial enforcement that we use is the ratio 
of the number of pending civil trials to the number of incoming civil trials in each 
district during the 2003-07 period.  The data include all civil trials except for work- 
and family-related cases.  The ratio of the number of pending civil trials to the number 
of incoming civil trials reflects the duration of future trials, while the length of trials 
(the first indicator) reflects the duration of current and past trials.  While many 
previous studies have used the number of pending trials as an indicator of poor judicial 
enforcement, they have used different normalization measures such as population, the 
number of judges, and the number of court personnel.  In our analysis, we normalized 
the number of pending trials by the number of incoming trials, as done by Fabbri and 
Padula (2004), but the estimation results do not change even if we use different 
normalization measures such as population and the number of judges.  As in the case 
of the first indicator of the degree of judicial enforcement, we used three dummy 
variables for the second indicator-- namely, 1st Enforcement Quartile2, 2nd Enforcement 
Quartile2, and 3rd Enforcement Quartile2, with the highest quartile (45.5 or higher) 
being the excluded category.  1st Enforcement Quartile2 is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the pending rate is less than 39.9; 2nd Enforcement Quartile2 is a dummy 
variable for pending rates between 39.9 and 43.0, and 3rd Enforcement Quartile2 is a 
dummy variable for pending rates between 43.0 and 45.5.  Thus, these dummy 
variables indicate better judicial enforcement than the excluded category.  
    In the first section, we stated that the duration of court proceedings in Japan has 
declined over time.  The question that arises is how the length of trials in Japan 
compares to that in other countries.  According to “The Second Report on the 
Acceleration of Trials,”9 the length of first civil trials in 2004 was 8.3 months in Japan, 
22.4 months in England, 9.6 months in France, and 8.5 months in the U.S.  The only 
country with shorter trials than Japan (7.2 months) was Germany.  In addition, 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer (2003) compared the duration of the 
process for collecting on a check returned for non-repayment in 109 countries, and  
according to their study, Japan ranked seventh from the bottom, with the process 
lasting 60 months.10  Thus, it can be stated that the duration of trials in Japan is short 
even by international standards. 
 
(Insert Figures 1 and 2 here) 
 
                                                  
9 In Japanese, Saiban no Jinsokuka ni kakaru Kenshou ni kansuru Houkokusho (Dai Ni-kai). 
http://www.courts.go.jp/about/siryo/jinsoku/hokoku/02/index.html  
10 Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer (2003) also calculate the average duration of the 
procedure for evicting a residential tenant for nonpayment of rent and find that the average duration 
of such a procedure in Japan is 363 months and that Japan ranks 87 among the 109 countries in their 
sample. 
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     We now present data on the two indicators of the degree of judicial enforcement 
across different districts in Japan.  Figures 1 and 2 show data on the length of trails and 
the ratio of the number of pending trials to the number of incoming trials, respectively, 
in each district court.  Figure 1 shows data on the length of trials in all 50 district 
courts in Japan, with the upper half of this figure showing data for 2000 and the lower 
half showing data for 2006, and as is evident from this figure, the length of trials was 
much shorter in 2006 than it was in 2000 in all districts, meaning that the degree of 
judicial enforcement improved throughout the country.  The median length of trials 
was 9.0 months in 2000 but only 7.7 months in 2006.  As can be seen from the gray 
bars, which indicate districts in which trials are longer than the median, poor judicial 
enforcement persists in some areas.  For instance, if we were to divide Japan into eight 
regions (namely, Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kanto, Chubu, Kinki, Chugoku, Shikoku, and 
Kyushu), we would conclude that the degree of judicial enforcement is the worst in 
Chubu, Kanto, and Shikoku.  By contrast, trials in Hokkaido were particularly short in 
both 2000 and 2006.   
Figure 2 shows data on the ratio of the number of pending trials to the number of 
incoming trials for all 50 districts, and as can be seen from this figure, this variable 
shows similar patterns to those for the length of trials shown in Figure 1.  While the 
ratio of pending trials to incoming trials declined in 2006, it is still high in Chubu and 
Kanto.  In addition, the ratio of pending trials to incoming trials in Hokkaido is smaller 
than the median, indicating that the degree of judicial enforcement is higher in 
Hokkaido than it is in other areas.    
 
III. Results 
 
In this section, we present the results of our empirical analysis of the impact of 
better judicial enforcement on the probability of being rationed (Section III.A), on loan 
size (Section III.B), and on the probability of bankruptcy (section III.B).  
 
A. The Probability of Being Credit Constrained and the Degree of Judicial 
Enforcement 
According to the theoretical model of Fabbri and Padula (2004), households are less 
likely to be credit constrained when loan contracts are enforced more strongly because 
households’ incentive to repay increases.  In this section, we test whether better 
judicial enforcement decreases the probability of being rationed using both a pooling 
logit model and a random effects logit model. 
 
Rit* = Xita +Eitb + νi+εit,     (1) 
Rit = 1 if Rit* > 0 
Rit = 0 if Rit* ≤ 0 
 
Rit* is an unobserved variable that is related to an observed variable on credit 
constraints Rit, and X are economic and demographic household characteristics that 
affect loan supply and demand, and E are three dummy variables (1st Enforcement 
Quartile, 2nd Enforcement Quartile, and 3rd Enforcement Quartile) that indicate better 
judicial enforcement compared to the excluded category (see section II B for details).  
Thus, the expected signs of the marginal effects of E are negative. 
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In order to identify credit-constrained households, we first need to identify loan 
applicants because households that did not apply for a loan cannot, by definition, be 
rationed by banks.  While the JPSC does not ask any questions about whether or not 
households applied for a loan, it does collect data on the amount of loans granted by 
financial institutions during the past year.  We defined households that were granted 
credit during the past year as well as those that were not granted credit and whose loan 
applications were rejected as loan applicants. 
     To determine whether households are credit constrained, we employed the 
responses to the following questions in the survey: “Was your (or your spouse’s) loan 
application turned down during the past year?” and “Was you (or your spouse’s) loan 
amount reduced when you applied for a loan during the past year?”11  Respondents 
who replied “yes” to one or both of the above questions were regarded as being credit 
constrained.   
     With regard to the household characteristics that influence credit rationing, we 
employed (1) the age and the square of the age of respondents (AGE, AGED); (2) the 
logarithm of the monthly disposable income of respondents (LINC),12 (3) a dummy 
variable that equals one if respondents are self-employed (SELF-EMPLOYED); (4) a 
dummy variable that equals one if respondents are unemployed (UNEMPLOYED); (5) 
the ratio of the monthly amount of loan repayments to monthly income (REPAY); (6) a 
dummy variable that equals one if respondents work in the same company in which  
they worked a year earlier (TENURE); (7) a dummy variable that equals one if the 
respondent graduated from college (COLLEGE); (8) the logarithm of the sum of the 
value of financial assets (bank and postal deposits and investment securities) and the 
value of real assets (land and housing) (LWEALTH); (9) the logarithm of loans 
outstanding (LLOAN); (10) a dummy variable that equals one if the respondent owns 
her own home (HOME); (11) a dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is 
married (MARRIED); (12) the number of children (CHILD); (13) a dummy variable that 
equals one if respondents live in metropolitan areas (METRO); (14) a dummy variable 
for medium city (MEDIUM CITY); (15) seven area dummies (AREA1–7); and (16) 
dummies for each year (YEAR2004–07).13  In addition, in order to take account of the 
regional economic situation and credit market activity, we included the per capita gross 
prefectural product in each prefecture (PREFECTURAL GDP), the ratio of 
                                                  
11 Many previous studies of borrowing constraints such as Cox and Jappelli (1993) and Duca and 
Rosenthal (1993) include households that were discouraged from applying for a loan.  While the 
survey we used also collects the information needed to identify discouraged borrowers, we did not 
include them in rationed households because discouraged borrowers fall in the subsample of those 
who did not apply for a loan.  However, we also tried classifying discouraged households as 
rationed households as a robustness check at the end of this section. 
12 The reason why we did not use annual disposable income is that the survey asks respondents 
about annual income earned in the previous calendar year and taxes paid in the previous calendar 
year.  Thus, if we had used annual disposable income, we would not have been able to use data for 
2007.  In order to avoid a further reduction in the number of observations, we employed monthly 
disposable income, which is available for the current calendar year. 
13 Our data set includes data on married as well as single respondents.  With respect to AGE, 
AGED, LINC, SELF-EMPLOYED, UNEMPLOYED, REPAY, TENURE, and COLLEGE, we use data 
on the respondent’s husband if the respondent is married and data on the respondent herself only if 
she is single because husbands are more likely to be the household head or the primary income 
earner. 
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nonperforming loans to total lending in regional banks by prefecture (BAD LOANS), the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (the sum of the squared individual shares of lending in 
regional banks by prefectures) (HERFINDAHL), and the ratio of total lending in each 
prefecture to prefectural GDP (DEPTH).14 
In the estimation, we focus only on households that applied for a loan during the 
past year.  This is because we cannot determine whether or not households were 
rationed by banks if they did not apply for a loan.  However, there is a possibility that 
using this subsample will result in sample selection bias because there might be a 
correlation between the unobservable factors that decide the probability of applying for 
a loan and those that decide the probability of being credit constrained.  Although we 
used a maximum-likelihood probit model with sample selection,15 the correlation 
between error terms of the two equations was not statistically different from zero for 
any specifications.16   Thus, we used only the sample of loan applicants in our 
estimation. 
 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
 
     Table 1 presents characteristics of loan applicants broken down by whether or not 
they are credit-rationed.17  Rationed households comprise 21% of the total (149/710).  
A comparison of rationed households with non-rationed households shows that rationed 
households have lower income, wealth, homeownership, debt, tenure, educational 
attainment, and per capita gross prefectural product than non-rationed households.  In 
addition, rationed households are more likely to be self-employed or unemployed and 
less likely to live in metropolitan areas.  Moreover, rationed households have more 
children and higher loan repayments than non-rationed households.  With respect to 
the judicial variables of interest, the means of 2nd Enforcement Quartile1 and 1st 
Enforcement Quartile2 are slightly higher in the case of rationed households than they 
are in the case of non-rationed households, which implies that better judicial 
enforcement increases the probability of being rationed.  Looking at the means of 2nd 
                                                  
14 Magri (2007) controlled for the portion of the loan that is recovered in the event of a borrower’s 
bankruptcy, but unfortunately, we were unable to control for this variable because of the lack of data. 
15 We used the heckprob command in STATA 9. 
16 Magri (2007) also found that the hypothesis that the errors in the two equations are uncorrelated 
cannot be rejected. 
17 The total number of observations, including loan applicants and non-applicants was 6862, and the 
number of households whose loan applications were rejected and/or whose loan size was reduced 
was 149.  Thus, on average, only 2% (149/6862) of households were credit constrained during the 
2003 to 2007 period.  However, if we include discouraged borrowers in rationed households in 
addition to rejected and reduced households, the share of rationed households increases to 4% 
(292/6862).  Kohara and Horioka (2006), who used different waves of the same survey that we 
used, found that 7.61%, 9.29%, and 15.40% of households were rejected, reduced, and/or 
discouraged in 1993, 1998, and 2003, respectively.  In our study, the proportion of rationed 
households is far less, but this difference is due mainly to the difference in the definition of credit 
constraints.  While Kohara and Horioka (2006) include households that were credit constrained in 
the past in credit-constrained households, we include only households that were credit-constrained 
during the past year in credit-constrained households.  If we use the same definition as that of 
Kohara and Horioka (2006), the proportion of credit-constrained households increases to 10% 
(128/1226) in 2007, which is relatively similar to the proportion of rationed households calculated 
by Kohara and Horioka (2006). 
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and 3rd Enforcement Quartile2, however, they are higher in the case of non-rationed 
households than they are in the case of rationed households.  Thus, the impact of better 
judicial enforcement is not clear from the descriptive statistics. 
 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
 
We turn now to the estimation results.  The results for the pooling logit model 
are shown in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2, whereas the results for the random effects 
logit model are shown in columns (3) and (4) of the same table.18  Let us first consider 
the impact of household characteristics on the probability of being rationed.  From the 
viewpoint of supply-side adverse selection, the debt ceiling should be lower for younger 
borrowers and therefore an increase in AGE should relax credit constraints.  In most 
cases, AGE has a significantly negative impact on the probability of being rationed, as 
expected.  For example, the marginal effects of AGE and AGED in (3) indicate that the 
probability of being rationed decreases until borrowers are about 41 years old (0.0826 / 
(2 * 0.0010)) and then approaches zero.  With respect to the impact of income, LINC 
does not have a significant impact in any case.  The insignificance of the marginal 
effect of LINC is contrary to expectation because an increase in income would be 
expected to relax credit constraints and is also contrary to the empirical evidence for the 
U.S. but is consistent with the findings of Kohara and Horioka (2006), who found that, 
in Japan, income is not an important factor in determining the probability of being 
rationed.  With respect to the impact of LWEALTH, we found that it has a significantly 
negative impact in most cases, which is as expected because if households’ assets are 
higher, we would expect the demand for credit to decrease and the debt ceiling to 
increase.  In addition, the marginal effects of HOME are insignificant in all cases, 
which is contrary to our expectation because we expected homeownership to be a proxy 
for collateral and for previous good credit records.  LLOAN was found to have a 
significantly negative impact on the probability of being rationed.  We expected that 
the higher are loans outstanding, the greater would be the probability of being rationed, 
but the negative impact we find might imply that large amounts of outstanding loans 
function as an indicator of good credit records in the past.  While SELF-EMPLOYED 
was found to have a significantly positive impact on the probability of being rationed in 
model (2), as expected, the marginal effects of UNEMPLOYED were found to be 
insignificant in all cases.  REPAY had a significantly positive impact on the probability 
of being rationed in all cases, which is as expected because the higher is the value of 
REPAY, the lower will be the ability to repay.  The results for TENURE imply that if 
tenure is longer, the probability of being rationed decreases, as expected.  Moreover, 
while Kohara and Horioka (2006) found that college graduates are significantly less 
likely to be borrowing constrained, in our results, the marginal effect of COLLEGE was 
insignificant, as found by Jappelli (1990).  MARRIED has a significant positive impact 
on the probability of being rationed.  This result is contrary to our expectation because, 
in general, we would expect married couples to be less likely to be rationed because 
their desired borrowing is lower than that of single people due to economies of scale 
                                                  
18 We performed a likelihood-ratio test and found that the null hypothesis—that the proportion of 
the total variance contributed by the panel-level variance component equals zero—was rejected.  
This indicates that the panel-level variance component is important and thus that a random effects 
logit model is preferable to a pooling logit model. 
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and because their debt ceiling is higher than that of single people due to factors such as 
lower mobility.  With respect to CHILD, we found that it has a significantly positive 
impact, which is as expected because if households have more children, we would 
expect their desired borrowing to increase and their credit constraints to become tighter.  
With respect to the remaining explanatory variables, it appears that city size (METRO 
and MEDIUM CITY) does not have a significant impact on the probability of being 
rationed.  Additionally, prefectural variables such as BAD LOANS and HERFINDAHL 
do not have a significant impact on the probability of being rationed, while 
PREFECTURAL GDP (DEPTH) has a significant negative (positive) impact on the 
probability of being rationed in some cases. 
With respect to the judicial variables of interest, none of the three dummy 
variables for Enforcement Quartile2 had a significant impact on the probability of being 
rationed.  On the other hand, 2nd Enforcement Quartile1 had a significantly positive 
impact on the probability of being rationed in model (1) of Table 2 even though all of 
the marginal effects of Enforcement Quartile1 are insignificant in model (3) of the same 
table.  The results for the pooling logit model suggest that better judicial enforcement 
increases the probability of being rationed, contrary to theoretical prediction.  
Considering the magnitude of the marginal effects of 2nd Enforcement Quartile1 in 
model (1) of Table 2, the probability of being rationed is 11 percentage points higher in 
judicial districts with second-best judicial enforcement than in judicial districts with the 
worst judicial enforcement.  As stated before, the percentage of rationed households 
was 21%, which means that moving from the worst judicial enforcement district to the 
second-best judicial enforcement district increases the probability of being rationed by 
52% ((11 / 21) * 100). 
As robustness checks, we first tried using dummy variables pertaining to the 
length of trials and to pending rates in high courts rather than in district courts.  High 
courts are located in eight major cities in Japan, and some high courts have branch 
courts (there are six branch courts in all of Japan).  Thus, the judicial data on high 
courts consist of only 14 categories in each year, which means that variation in the 
judicial data on high courts across individuals is considerably smaller than that in the 
judicial data on district courts.  As expected, dummy variables pertaining to the length 
of trials and pending rates in high courts either did not have a significant impact on the 
probability of being rationed or were dropped during the estimation due to colinearity.  
Second, we tried using dummy variables pertaining to pending rates in summary 
courts.19  The judicial data on summary courts consist of 50 categories in each year, 
which is the same number as in the case of district courts.  The dummy variables 
pertaining to pending rates in summary courts did not have a significant impact on 
credit allocation.  This result is consistent with the results presented in Table 2, which 
are based on dummy variables pertaining to pending rates in district courts, and 
suggests that the future duration of trials might be irrelevant in determining the 
probability of being rationed.20 
Lastly, we tried including discouraged borrowers, who were previously excluded 
because they did not apply for a loan, in rationed households.  We found that this 
                                                  
19 For summary courts, no data are available on the length of trials. 
20 We also tried using the length of trials and that of the ratio of the number of pending trials to the 
number of incoming trials instead of dummy variables thereon and found that the marginal effects of 
the two are insignificant with respect to the probability of being rationed. 
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caused the impact of judicial enforcement on the probability of being rationed to 
become more significant.  More specifically, in the pooling logit model, all the dummy 
variables for Enforcement Quartile1 had a significantly positive impact on the 
probability of being rationed.  Moreover, in the random effects logit model, 2nd and 3rd 
Enforcement Quartile1 had a significantly positive impact on the probability of being 
rationed.  These results provide further support for the view that better judicial 
enforcement increases the probability of being rationed, as shown in model (1) of Table 
2, and are again contrary to theoretical prediction. 
 
B. Loan Size and the Degree of Judicial Enforcement 
In theory, if the degree of judicial enforcement is weak, banks would be expected to try 
to compensate for the lower liquidation value of the pledged collateral by raising 
interest rates, and this will reduce loan size in equilibrium.  In this section, we test 
whether better judicial enforcement increases loan size.  According to the JPSC data, 
12% of loan applicants were not granted any credit during the past year.  In order to 
take account of the widespread presence of zeros regarding loan size, we conducted 
both pooling Tobit21 and random effects Tobit estimations.22 
 
Lit = Xita +Eitb +νi+εit     (2) 
 
The dependent variable we use in this analysis is the logarithm of loan size 
granted by banks during the past year, while the explanatory variables are the same as 
those described in Section III.A.  Thus, the expected signs of the marginal effects of 
better judicial enforcement E are positive.   
 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
 
The estimation results are shown in Table 3.  Looking first at the impact of 
household characteristics, LWEALTH has a significantly positive impact in every case, 
which is as expected because if households have more wealth, they can pledge more 
collateral to lenders.  On the other hand, HOME has a significantly negative impact on 
loan size, which might be because owning a home lowers the demand for new (housing) 
loans.  LLOAN has a significantly positive impact on loan size, which might be the 
result of a simultaneity problem arising from the fact that LLOAN includes not only 
loans granted more than one year earlier but also loans granted during the past year.  
The inference is supported by the fact that if we exclude loans granted during the past 
year from LLOAN, the marginal effects of LLOAN become insignificant in most cases.  
Furthermore, we found that TENURE has a significantly positive impact on loan size, 
which is consistent with our expectations.  MARRIED has a significantly negative 
impact on loan size, and this might be because married couples have a lower demand for 
loans as a result of economies of scale in the consumption of durables.  In addition, 
CHILD has a significantly negative impact on loan size, which might be because the 
                                                  
21 We utilized an interval regression with left-censoring of observations and robust standard errors 
adjusted for clusters in households to estimate our Tobit model. 
22 The null hypothesis (that the panel-level variance component equals zero) was rejected.  This 
result indicates that the panel-level variance component is important and thus that a random effects 
Tobit model is preferable to a pooling Tobit model. 
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debt ceiling allowed by banks decreases when households have more children. 
With respect to the judicial variables of interest, the marginal effects of all 
dummies pertaining to Enforcement Quartile2 were insignificant.  On the other hand, 
the marginal effects of all dummy variables pertaining to Enforcement Quartile 1 were 
significantly negative.  These results are again contrary to our expectation that better 
judicial enforcement increases the credit granted by lenders.  Moreover, the magnitude 
of the impact of a change in the degree of judicial enforcement is considerable.  The 
estimation results derived from the random effects Tobit model suggest that moving 
from a judicial district with the worst judicial enforcement to judicial districts with the 
best, second best, and third best judicial enforcement reduces loan size by 78% 
((exp(–1.5215) – 1) * 100), 76% ((exp(–1.4181) – 1) * 100), and 56% ((exp(–0.8137) – 
1) * 100), respectively.   
In order to check the robustness of our results, we first tried using the length of 
trials and the ratio of the number of pending trials to the number of incoming trials 
instead of using dummy variables thereon.  We found that the marginal effect of the 
length of trials was significantly positive with respect to loan size both in the pooling 
Tobit and random effects Tobit models, which is consistent with the results shown in 
Table 3.  Second, we tried using dummy variables pertaining to the pending rates in 
summary courts23 and found that the dummy variables pertaining to pending rates in 
summary courts did not have significant impact on loan size, which is also consistent 
with the results shown in Table 3.  
     Based on the estimation results presented in sections III.A and III.B, we can 
conclude that better judicial enforcement increases the probability of being rationed and 
decreases loan size.  These results are opposite in sign to the theoretical results of 
Fabbri and Padula (2004) and Jappelli, Pagano, and Bianco (2005).  We provide one 
possible theoretical explanation of our findings below:24 
Credit markets operate under substantial asymmetries of information.  For 
example, borrowers may be either creditworthy and honest, or dishonest.  The former 
type of borrower repays its debts as long as it has the ability to do so, while the latter 
type of borrower never repays its debts.  Although the lender understands that 
borrowers are heterogeneous, she is unable to distinguish one from the other.  Assume 
that there are two ways to screen borrowers.  One is a more costly but more effective 
way, which produces a more informative signal about the type of borrower.  The other 
is a less costly but less effective way.  In particular, think of delayed information 
revelation as a less effective way of screening.  There may not be sufficient 
information about some borrowers when they apply for a loan, but with some 
low-intensive monitoring, more information might become available later.  Examples 
of what this type of screening might involve are: (a) cutting the amount of the initial 
loan, and conditional on adverse information not being revealed later or on good 
information being revealed later, increasing the loan amount after some time and (b) 
rejecting an initial application, presenting the borrower with a harsher budget constraint 
for a while so that the borrower disciplines herself, and then extending the loan. There is 
one crucial assumption that is needed here—namely that if the more costly but more 
effective screening method is used at the optimal intensity, then the benefits from 
                                                  
23 For summary courts, no data are available on the length of trials. 
24 This interpretation was suggested by an anonymous referee of this journal.  We greatly 
appreciate his/her enormous help and contribution. 
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information generated by the less costly screening method do not outweigh the costs. If 
this assumption is satisfied, the intensity of the costly screening method will be high and 
the costless screening method will become redundant when the degree of judicial 
enforcement is weak.  However, when the degree of judicial enforcement is strong, the 
intensity of the costly screening method will be reduced, and the benefits from the less 
costly screening method will outweigh the costs.  As argued above, by its very nature, 
this screening method might involve cutting the initial loan size and denying approval to 
elicit more information. 
 
C. The Probability of Bankruptcy and the Degree of Judicial Enforcement 
If the degree of judicial enforcement is strong, banks may not screen borrowers 
adequately and erroneously evaluate bad (good) borrowers as good (bad) ones, resulting 
in an increase in the probability of bankruptcy.  In this section, we test whether or not 
better judicial enforcement increases the probability of bankruptcy.  Although we were 
inclined to take advantage of the panel nature of the data, panel logit estimation did not 
work well because only a small number of households went bankrupt.  Therefore, we 
chose to conduct a pooling probit estimation. 
 
Bi* = Xia +Eib + Aic + νi,     (3) 
Bi = 1 if Bi* > 0 
Bi = 0 if Bi* ≤ 0 
 
Bit* is an unobserved variable that is related to observed data on bankruptcy B.  
To construct the dependent variable, we used the following two questions: “Did you 
experience personal bankruptcy or the bankruptcy of your own company during the past 
year?” and “Did you have difficulty making loan repayments during the past year?”  
The former question is the most appropriate one for testing our hypothesis, and thus the 
latter question appears to be redundant.  However, since households that went bankrupt 
comprise only 0.2% of the total (14/6222), commonly used statistical procedures such 
as probit might not be estimated.  Therefore, we also took account of information 
regarding difficulties with loan repayments because households experiencing such 
difficulties presumably have a higher probability of future bankruptcy.  More 
specifically, we defined a dummy variable that equals one if households answered “yes” 
to at least one of these two questions and zero otherwise and used it as our dependent 
variable. 
For explanatory variables that affect bankruptcy, we used the same explanatory 
variables X as in sections III.A and III.B, with the exception of UNEMPLOYED.  
Moreover, we used three dummy variables A that indicate adverse events.25  The three 
dummy variables we used are DIVORCE (whether or not the respondent was divorced 
during the past year), LOST JOB (whether or not the respondent or her family members 
lost their jobs during the past year),26 and SICK (whether or not the respondent or her 
family members were sick during the past year).  E represents three dummy variables 
(1st Enforcement Quartile, 2nd Enforcement Quartile, and 3rd Enforcement Quartile), as 
                                                  
25 See, for example, Fay, Hurst, and White (2002) for an empirical study that investigates the impact 
of adverse events on personal bankruptcy. 
26  We dropped UNEMPLOYED because we wanted to include LOST JOB and because 
UNEMPLOYED and LOST JOB are highly correlated. 
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in sections III.A and III.B.  Thus, the expected signs of the marginal effects of E are 
positive. 
 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
 
The estimation results are shown in Table 4.  Looking first at the estimation 
results pertaining to household characteristics, although the level of income does not 
have a significant impact on the probability of bankruptcy, all adverse events 
(DIVORCE, LOST JOB, and SICK) that reduce the ability to repay loans have a 
significantly positive impact on the probability of bankruptcy.  Moreover, the 
magnitudes of these effects are also pronounced: DIVORCE, LOST JOB, and SICK 
increase the probability of bankruptcy by 1.97, 1.01, and 0.11 percentage points, 
respectively.  Since the share of bankrupt households is 0.56%, divorce, losing a job, 
and becoming sick increase the probability of bankruptcy by 352%, 180%, and 20%, 
respectively.  Moreover, although we found that LWEALTH, SELF-EMPLOYED, 
REPAY, TENURE, MARRIED, BAD LOANS, and HERFINDAHL have a significant 
impact on the probability of bankruptcy although the magnitudes of their marginal 
effects are not very large. 
Let us look next at the role played by the degree of judicial enforcement.  As 
expected, the 1st and 2nd Enforcement Quartile1 and 1st Enforcement Quartile2 all have 
a positive impact on the probability of bankruptcy.  These results imply that better 
judicial enforcement increases the probability of bankruptcy, as shown in Zazzaro 
(2005).  To appreciate the magnitude of this distortion, we computed how the 
probability of bankruptcy changes if the average household moves from a judicial 
district with the worst judicial enforcement to a district with better judicial enforcement.  
Using the results for Enforcement Quartile1 as an example, moving from a judicial 
district with the worst judicial enforcement to a district with the best and second-best 
judicial enforcement increases the probability of bankruptcy by 0.16 and 0.21 
percentage points, respectively.  Since the proportion of bankrupt households is 0.56%, 
the probability of bankruptcy is 29% and 38% higher in judicial districts with the best 
and second-best judicial enforcement than it is in judicial districts with the worst 
judicial enforcement. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
In this paper, we conducted an empirical analysis of the impact of better judicial 
enforcement (i.e., faster court proceedings) on the probability of being credit rationed, 
loan size, and the probability of bankruptcy using household-level data from the 
Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers, conducted by the Institute for Research on 
Household Economics, in conjunction with judicial data by court district on trial length 
and the ratio of the number of pending civil trials to the number of incoming civil trials. 
The existing theory predicts that, if the degree of judicial enforcement is strong, 
the household’s incentive to repay its loans will increase and banks will be less likely to 
ration credit.  In addition, since better judicial enforcement makes the liquidation value 
of the pledged collateral higher, banks should reduce interest rates and loan size should 
increase in equilibrium when the degree of judicial enforcement is strong.  However, 
contrary to this traditional view, we found that better judicial enforcement increases the 
probability of being credit rationed and decreases loan size.  The following is a 
17 
 
possible interpretation of this result.  Since the intensity of costly screening is reduced 
if the degree of judicial enforcement is strong, a lender might not have sufficient 
information about a borrower and thus might reject the initial loan application and cut 
the initial loan size in order to elicit more information if the degree of judicial 
enforcement is strong. 
Furthermore, we explored the impact of the degree of judicial enforcement on the 
probability of bankruptcy and found that better judicial enforcement increases the 
probability of bankruptcy.  This finding is consistent with the lax screening effect, 
whereby better judicial enforcement increases the probability of bankruptcy because 
improvements in the degree of judicial enforcement reduce the bank’s incentive to 
screen borrowers adequately and worsen the quality of credit allocation. 
In sum, our estimation results found that better judicial enforcement facilitates the 
recovery of loans but that it may be socially harmful because it reduces the amount of 
credit granted to households and increases their bankruptcy rate.  Thus, better judicial 
enforcement may not necessarily be a good thing. 
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Figure 1: The Length of Civil Trials (in Months) in District Courts (Upper Graph: 2000; Lower Graph: 2006) 
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Source: The Public Relations Division of the Supreme Court.  Note: The length of trials measures the time elapsed between the date of the initial 
recording of a trial and that of the court verdict.  Trials include all first civil trials in district courts. 
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Figure 2: Number of Pending Trials / Number of Incoming Trials in District Courts (Upper Graph: 2000; Lower Graph: 2006) 
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Source: Annual Report of Judicial Statistics. 1. Civil Cases (2000, 2006). General Secretariat, Supreme Court. 
Note: Trials include all civil trials in district courts with the exception of work- and family-related cases. 
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Table 1: Characteristics of Households that Applied for a Loan 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
1 st  Enforcement Quartile1  (dummy variable) 0.25 0.44 0.25 0.44 0.25 0.43
2 nd  Enforcement Quartile1  (dummy variable) 0.19 0.39 0.18 0.39 0.23 0.42
3 rd  Enforcement Quartile1  (dummy variable) 0.30 0.46 0.30 0.46 0.30 0.46
1 st  Enforcement Quartile2  (dummy variable) 0.24 0.43 0.23 0.42 0.29 0.45
2 nd  Enforcement Quartile2  (dummy variable) 0.29 0.45 0.30 0.46 0.26 0.44
3 rd  Enforcement Quartile2  (dummy variable) 0.22 0.41 0.23 0.42 0.17 0.38
AGE 37.33 8.00 37.53 7.71 36.58 9.00
INC  (in tens of thousands of yen) 26.27 15.16 27.21 14.38 22.73 17.39
WEALTH  (in tens of thousands of yen) 1610.16 2063.73 1812.85 2172.03 846.98 1345.35
HOME  (dummy variable) 0.60 0.49 0.65 0.48 0.44 0.50
LOAN  (in tens of thousands of yen) 956.40 1185.51 1006.01 1195.18 769.62 1132.88
SELF-EMPLOYED  (dummy variable) 0.13 0.33 0.11 0.32 0.19 0.39
UNEMPLOYED  (dummy variable) 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.17 0.09 0.28
REPAY  (in ratio form) 0.35 0.42 0.32 0.38 0.43 0.57
TENURE  (dummy variable) 0.77 0.42 0.82 0.39 0.60 0.49
COLLEGE  (dummy variable) 0.23 0.42 0.25 0.43 0.14 0.35
MARRIED  (dummy variable) 0.77 0.42 0.77 0.42 0.75 0.43
CHILD 1.62 1.15 1.57 1.13 1.79 1.20
METRO  (dummy variable) 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.43 0.17 0.38
MEDIUM CITY  (dummy variable) 0.65 0.48 0.64 0.48 0.71 0.45
PREFECTURAL GDP  (in billions of yen) 4.37 1.29 4.43 1.32 4.15 1.16
BAD LOANS  (in percent) 5.14 1.92 5.10 1.90 5.29 1.98
HERFINDAHL  (in percent) 54.58 23.82 54.02 23.92 56.70 23.36
DEPTH  (in ratio form) 0.68 0.38 0.69 0.39 0.65 0.34
Number of Observations 710 561 149
Non-Rationed RationedFull
 
Note: Data was taken from the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers for the 2003-07 period.  “Full” refers to all households that applied for a loan during  
the past year.  “Non-Rationed” refers to households that applied for a loan but were not rationed during the past year.  “Rationed” refers to households 
that not only applied for a loan but also had their loan applications rejected and/or their loan amount reduced during the past year. 
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Table 2: Judicial Enforcement and the Probability of Being Credit Rationed 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
1 st  Enforcement Quartile1 0.0373 0.0514
(0.0623) (0.1415)
2 nd  Enforcement Quartile1 0.1066 * 0.1514
(0.0647) (0.1383)
3 rd  Enforcement Quartile1 0.0485 0.1081
(0.0471) (0.1127)
1 st  Enforcement Quartile2 -0.0178 -0.0519
(0.0560) (0.1436)
2 nd  Enforcement Quartile2 -0.0308 -0.0785
(0.0404) (0.1066)
3 rd  Enforcement Quartile2 -0.0375 -0.0740
(0.0426) (0.1003)
AGE -0.0430 ** -0.0435 ** -0.0826 * -0.0816 *
(0.0175) (0.0177) (0.0451) (0.0448)
AGED 0.0005 ** 0.0005 ** 0.0010 * 0.0010 *
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0006)
LINC 0.0027 0.0033 0.0051 0.0054
(0.0061) (0.0064) (0.0174) (0.0177)
LWEALTH -0.0089 ** -0.0088 ** -0.0156 * -0.0152
(0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0094) (0.0095)
HOME 0.0180 0.0188 -0.0135 -0.0139
(0.0507) (0.0511) (0.1333) (0.1337)
LLOAN -0.0337 *** -0.0331 *** -0.0742 *** -0.0726 ***
(0.0050) (0.0049) (0.0218) (0.0224)
SELF-EMPLOYED 0.0788 0.0966 * 0.1505 0.1751
(0.0541) (0.0554) (0.1236) (0.1183)
UNEMPLOYED 0.0037 0.0096 0.0730 0.0744
(0.0832) (0.0865) (0.2364) (0.2360)
REPAY 0.1173 *** 0.1134 *** 0.2284 ** 0.2151 **
(0.0396) (0.0390) (0.1085) (0.1112)
TENURE -0.1310 ** -0.1387 ** -0.2774 ** -0.2888 **
(0.0547) (0.0561) (0.1158) (0.1206)
COLLEGE -0.0065 -0.0107 -0.0425 -0.0516
(0.0497) (0.0495) (0.1168) (0.1160)
MARRIED 0.0729 * 0.0727 * 0.1915 * 0.1880 *
(0.0397) (0.0402) (0.1063) (0.1088)
CHILD 0.0443 ** 0.0426 ** 0.0895 ** 0.0857 **
(0.0183) (0.0184) (0.0435) (0.0436)
METRO -0.0289 -0.0252 -0.0496 -0.0436
(0.0520) (0.0551) (0.1482) (0.1537)
Marginal Effect
(Standard Error)
Pooling Logit Random Effects Logit
Marginal Effect
(Standard Error)
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Table 2: Judicial Enforcement and the Probability of Being Credit Rationed 
(Cont’d) 
 
MEDIUM CITY 0.0103 0.0082 0.0267 0.0159
(0.0423) (0.0435) (0.1106) (0.1093)
PREFECTURAL GDP -0.0616 * -0.0599 * -0.1360 -0.1209
(0.0358) (0.0340) (0.0908) (0.0898)
BAD LOANS -0.0054 -0.0071 -0.0136 -0.0162
(0.0105) (0.0101) (0.0265) (0.0257)
HERFINDAHL -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0001
(0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0023) (0.0022)
DEPTH 0.1954 0.2147 * 0.4116 0.4339
(0.1279) (0.1244) (0.3539) (0.3457)
Number of Observations
Wald Chi2 (33)
     Prob > Chi2
Log Likelihood
Pseudo R-squared
LR test of rho = 0: chibar2(01)
     Prob >= Chibar2 - - 0.000 0.000
87.66
-281.06277
0.2295 0.2257
- - 16.52 17.93
710
-282.45244 -272.80040 -273.48984
0.0000 0.00000.0000
710
122.27 85.55
710
132.91
0.0000
710
 
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the household’s loan 
application was rejected and/or its loan amount was reduced during the past year and zero otherwise.  
In addition, we also included seven area dummies and four year dummies, but their marginal effects 
and standard errors are not shown.  Moreover, the marginal effects of the continuous variables were 
evaluated at their means and those of dummy variables show the change in the dependent variable 
when the value of the dummy variable changes from zero to one.  Furthermore, the standard errors 
in the pooling logit model were adjusted for clustering on households and those in the random 
effects logit model were bootstrapped.  Finally, *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3: Judicial Enforcement and Loan Size 
Explanatory Variable
1 st  Enforcement Quartile1 -1.6918 *** -1.5215 ***
(0.6617) (0.5158)
2 nd  Enforcement Quartile1 -1.7145 *** -1.4181 ***
(0.5832) (0.4798)
3 rd  Enforcement Quartile1 -0.9435 ** -0.8137 **
(0.4146) (0.3559)
1 st  Enforcement Quartile2 0.2255 0.1571
(0.7102) (0.6544)
2 nd  Enforcement Quartile2 0.2340 0.2044
(0.5237) (0.5327)
3 rd  Enforcement Quartile2 0.6300 0.4304
(0.4669) (0.4411)
AGE 0.2169 0.2039 0.1905 0.1741
(0.2128) (0.2122) (0.1795) (0.1782)
AGED -0.0024 -0.0022 -0.0021 -0.0019
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0022)
LINC 0.0361 0.0266 0.0398 0.0323
(0.0820) (0.0821) (0.0726) (0.0732)
LWEALTH 0.1381 *** 0.1354 *** 0.1026 *** 0.0995 ***
(0.0394) (0.0397) (0.0364) (0.0361)
HOME -1.6883 *** -1.6963 *** -1.3240 *** -1.3273 ***
(0.4209) (0.4296) (0.4367) (0.4290)
LLOAN 0.9339 *** 0.9297 *** 0.8399 *** 0.8379 ***
(0.0693) (0.0699) (0.0451) (0.0463)
SELF-EMPLOYED 0.5594 0.4693 0.4663 0.4020
(0.5836) (0.5861) (0.5616) (0.5468)
UNEMPLOYED -0.1760 -0.2481 -0.2498 -0.2945
(1.4252) (1.4455) (1.2855) (1.2659)
REPAY -0.1075 -0.1267 0.0790 0.0502
(0.2663) (0.2718) (0.3213) (0.3362)
TENURE 0.7798 0.8574 * 0.6576 0.7454 *
(0.5270) (0.5342) (0.4487) (0.4509)
COLLEGE 0.3982 0.4334 0.4371 0.4611
(0.3555) (0.3514) (0.3532) (0.3656)
MARRIED -0.9992 * -1.0121 * -0.8612 * -0.8681 *
(0.5393) (0.5523) (0.4689 (0.4839)
CHILD -0.4378 ** -0.4257 ** -0.4080 ** -0.4074 **
(0.2234) (0.2223) (0.1811) (0.1815)
METRO 0.4304 0.3543 0.3787 0.3095
(0.6164) (0.6354) (0.5592) (0.5592)
Pooling Tobit
Marginal Effect
(Standard Error)
Random Effects Tobit
Marginal Effect
(Standard Error)
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Table 3: Judicial Enforcement and Loan Size (Cont’d) 
 
MEDIUM CITY 0.2369 0.2411 0.2153 0.2257
(0.5154) (0.5252) (0.4249) (0.4200)
PREFECTURAL GDP -0.1740 0.0145 -0.2106 -0.0332
(0.3917) (0.3574) (0.4045) (0.3341)
BAD LOANS 0.0218 0.0741 0.0126 0.0586
(0.1091) (0.1054) (0.1088) (0.1077)
HERFINDAHL -0.0029 0.0007 -0.0041 -0.0004
(0.0120) (0.0111) (0.0119) (0.0107)
DEPTH 0.7346 -0.1304 0.7855 0.0267
(1.3432) (1.2800) (1.3922) (1.2463)
Number of Observations 710 710
Wald Chi2 (33) 337.08 326.05
     Prob > Chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Log Likelihood -1868.818 -1872.38
LR test of sigma_u = 0: chibar2(01) - -
     Prob >= Chibar2 - - 0.000
710
359.68
0.0000
-1864.3334
16.09
0.000
16.23
710
343.99
0.0000
-1860.7007
 
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the loan amount granted during the past year.  We 
also controlled for seven area dummies and four year dummies, but their marginal effects and 
standard errors are not shown.  Moreover, marginal effects of continuous variables were evaluated 
at means and those of dummy variables are discrete changes as dummy variables change from zero 
to one.  In addition, standard errors in the pooling Tobit model were adjusted for clustering on 
households and those in the random effects Tobit model were bootstrapped.  Finally, *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Judicial Enforcement and the Probability of Bankruptcy 
Marginal Effect Marginal Effect
Explanatory Variable (Standard Error) (Standard Error)
1 st  Enforcement Quartile1 0.0016 **
(0.0015)
2 nd  Enforcement Quartile1 0.0021 ***
(0.0014)
3 rd  Enforcement Quartile1 -0.0002
(0.0002)
1 st  Enforcement Quartile2 0.0012 *
(0.0011)
2 nd  Enforcement Quartile2 0.0007
(0.0007)
3 rd  Enforcement Quartile2 -0.0002
(0.0003)
DIVORCE 0.0197 *** 0.0224 ***
(0.0151) (0.0156)
LOST JOB 0.0101 *** 0.0106 ***
(0.0069) (0.0070)
SICK 0.0011 *** 0.0015 ***
(0.0008) (0.0010)
AGE -0.0000 -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001)
AGED 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
LINC -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
LWEALTH -0.0001 *** -0.0001 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
HOME -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.0004) (0.0005)
LLOAN 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
SELF-EMPLOYED 0.0015 *** 0.0019 ***
(0.0013) (0.0016)
REPAY 0.0001 * 0.0002 *
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Pooling Probit
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Table 4: Judicial Enforcement and the Probability of Bankruptcy (Cont’d) 
 
TENURE -0.0033 *** -0.0043 ***
(0.0019) (0.0024)
COLLEGE -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0003)
MARRIED 0.0007 *** 0.0009 ***
(0.0004) (0.0005)
CHILD -0.0000 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001)
METRO 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0004)
MEDIUM CITY -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0004)
PREFECTURAL GDP 0.0002 -0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0003)
BAD LOANS 0.0001 * 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001)
HERFINDAHL -0.0000 *** -0.0000 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
DEPTH -0.0011 -0.0006
(0.0009) (0.0011)
Number of Observations 6222 6222
Wald Chi2 (35) 211.57 200.76
     Prob > Chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Log Pseudolikelihood -142.60904 -144.66652
Pseudo R-squared 0.3404 0.3309  
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the household experienced  
personal bankruptcy and/or the bankruptcy of its own company during the past year and/or faced 
difficulties with loan repayments during the past year and zero otherwise.  We also controlled for 
seven area dummies and four year dummies, but their marginal effects and standard errors are not 
shown.  In addition, the marginal effects of the continuous variables were evaluated at their means 
and those of dummy variables show the change in the dependent variable when the value of the 
dummy variable changes from zero to one.  Moreover, standard errors were adjusted for clustering 
on households.  Finally, *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
